

Think like a hacker: Secure Drupal code

Greg Knaddison Ben Jeavons

Security is boring*

Doesn't affect me Doesn't have good ROI

*May not apply to you.



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Data breach costs LinkedIn up to \$1 million


By Marcos Colon on Aug 6, 2012 3:36 PM Filed under Risk


LinkedIn's 2Q earnings call reveals that the company spent between \$500,000 to \$1 million on forensic work surrounding a recent data compromise.

		Moorroud
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Keywords linkedin, data breach, forensics Company/Organisation	LinkedIn announced the recuperation costs of the recent data breach could have topped \$1 million. Cheif financial officer Steve Sordello said the costs included forensic work and "other elements" relating to the breach.	Call of Duty botnet launches 10Gbps DDoS
		 Site sells 554 Australian credit cards
		 Myki security scare 'offers nothing' to fraudste
		 Battle.net hacked, Aussie account data compromised
linkedin	He said the 175-million-member company continued to strengthen its	
	website's security and is expected to add \$2 million to \$3 million in costs in the current guarter toward those efforts.	SC Magazine follows Top IT security tweets
Technology		
Technology	website's security and is expected to add \$2 million to \$3 million in costs in the current quarter toward those efforts.	SC Magazine follows Top IT security tweets
	He said the 175-million-member company continued to strengthen its	



Most Read





Cracking Drupal €25

SIGNED by the author

http://www.flickr.com/photos/ezrabg/6860635970/

Think like a hacker

http://www.flickr.com/photos/31246066@N04/4252587897/

Greg Knaddison

Ben Jeavons

@greggles

@benswords

Acould[™]

Members of Drupal Security Team

be the attacker

Say hello to \$user_data

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
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




user agent language time zone referrer & more HTTP request headers

Lots of tools/ways to modify these for requests

Drupal vulnerabilities by type



XSS Authentication/Session Others Access Bypass Arbitrary Code Execution

48%

CSRF SQL Injection

reported in core and contrib SAs from 6/1/2005 through 3/24/2010

CSRF Cross Site Request Forgery Taking action without confirming intent.

Taking action without confirming intent.


How do we confirm intent?


WTF is intent?


Delete user 1


Delete user l

CSRF Flow









How do you exploit it?

- URL Shorteners
- <img src="<u>http://example.com/delete/2</u>">
- Send a message to a site admin
 - What is my email address or twitter?

Are you my CSRF?

- menu callback with an action verb and not drupal_get_form
- directly use \$_POST, \$_GET, arg(), menu object
- not using form_submit OR drupal_get_token

Tokens (aka nonce)

• Form API includes tokens by default

do form, form_validate, form_submit

don't \$_POST

OR: drupal_get_token, drupal_valid_token

CSRF Resources

http://drupalscout.com/tags/csrf

XSS

aka: Cross Site Scripting code in browser using your session




• Code


- Running in your browser
- Using your cookies on your site
- Requesting, sending, reading responses
- Browser context

Does that sound familiar?


https://vimeo.com/15447718




Cross Site Scripting



Cross Site Scripting



Cross Site Scripting



Validate input

"Why would I ever want javascript in a node title?" -developer who forgot to filter on output

Validate input


• Is it an email?

Is it a nid (right type? that they have access to?)
 Validation is NOT filtering
 Validation is "yes or no" - user fixes it


Filter on output

• "output"





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


Output Contexts

- Mail context
- Database context
- Web context
- Server context
- <u>http://acko.net/blog/safe-string-theory-for-</u> <u>the-web</u>

Filtering XSS

- Input untrusted data
- Output browser appropriate data
- check_plain, check_markup
- filter_xss, filter_xss_admin
- free: l(), t() @ and %, drupal_set_title



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Are you my XSS?

- odrupal_set_message(\$user_data);
- \$output .= \$node->title;
- FAPI checkboxes, radios, descriptions, etc.

XSS Resources

http://drupalscout.com/tags/xss

Access Bypass Authentication Authorization

What is it?

See something they shouldn't see
Do something they shouldn't do

Stop Access Bypass

Check before providing the actionCheck before taking action

Where do we check?

- Request arrives
- Find menu callback
- Call it
- Alter that
- Preprocess it
- Theme it

- 'access callback' => TRUE,
- Page callback
- \$form['#access'] = whatevs();
- \$form['f']['#access'] = whatevs();
- \$o = theme('username', \$account);

R U my Access Bypass?

- Menu callbacks kind of important
- node_access()
- \$query->addTag('node_access')
- hook_permission/user_access

Resources

- drupal.org/security/writing-secure-code
- groups.drupal.org/best-practices-drupal-security
- drupalscout.com
- crackingdrupal.com

Mostly automated review

- drupal.org/project/security_review
- drupal.org/project/hacked
- drupal.org/project/coder
- drupal.org/project/secure_code_review
- Vuln: github.com/unn/vuln
- More: <u>http://drupalscout.com/node/11</u>

Pen-testing tools

Too many false positives
Instead, use Drupal specific tools
Peer review code
Contribute code

Automated analysis++

• Acquia Insight

• Near real-time 100+ checks

Routinely alert you to mistakes

Evaluate our session, please

munich2012.drupal.org/node/733

Thanks!

@greggles @benswords



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